The aim of this paper is to introduce cooperative games with a feasible coalition system which is called antimatroid. These combinatorial structures generalize the permission structures, which have nice economical applications. With this goal, we …rst characterize the approaches from a permission structure with special classes of antimatroids. Next, we use the concept of interior operator in an antimatroid and we de…ne the restricted game taking into account the limited possibilities of cooperation determined by the antimatroid. These games extend the restricted games obtained by permission structures. Finally, we provide a computational method to obtain the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the restricted game, by using the worths of the original game. Mathematics Subject Classi…cation 2000: 91A12
Introduction
A TU-game or transferable utility game describes a situation in which a …nite set of players N can generate certain payo¤s by cooperation. We will denote by ¡ N the set of all TU-games on N . In a TU-game the players are assumed to be socially identical in the sense that every player can cooperate with every other player. However, in practice there exist social asymmetries among the players. For this reason, the game theoretic analysis of decision processes in which one imposes asymmetric constraints on the behavior of the players has been and continue being an important subject to make a study. So, important consequences have been obtained of adopting this type of restrictions on economic behavior. Some models, in which have been analyzed social asymmetries among players in a TU-game, are described in e.g. Myerson [17] , Owen [19] and Borm, Owen and Tijs [3] . In these models the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a communication graph.
Another type of asymmetry among the players in a TU-game is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [12] , Gilles and Owen [13] and van den Brink and Gilles [4] . In these models, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in the so-called permission structure. Other related models can be found in Faigle and Kern [11] and Derks and Peters [6] .
In the present paper, we use the restricted cooperation model derived from an antimatroid. Section 2 introduces permission structures and antimatroids and we show that given a permission structure, the approaches from it are an antimatroid but not every antimatroid is an approach from a permission structure. Moreover, we identify the approaches from an acyclic permission structure with antimatroids satisfying speci…c properties. This study gives rise to a new class of antimatroids obtained through permission structures. Two new concepts in these structures are essential, on one hand the path property and on the other hand the feasible hull which are both based in the path characterization of antimatroids. Section 3 introduces the restricted games on antimatroids which generalize the ones studied on permission structures. Next, we study in detail some properties of these games, above all those properties that are transmitted from the original game to the restricted game, and we give a description of the dividends in such games. Using the structural properties from the antimatroid we will be able to express the dividends in terms of the original game. This result will be essential in the last section to provide some formulas to compute the Shapley and Banzhaf values for restricted games on antimatroids. In these formulas these values are computed by means of the original game without having to calculate the restricted game and taking into account only the coalitions in the antimatroid.
Permission structures and antimatroids
Permission structures were de…ned by Gilles et al. [12] . They assume that players who participate in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical organization in which there are players that need permission from certain other players before they are allowed to cooperate.
For a …nite set of players N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng such a hierarchical organization is given by a mapping S : N ! 2 N which is called a permission structure on N . The players in S (i) are called the successors of player i in the permission structure S and the players in S ¡1 (i) = fj 2 N : i 2 S (j)g are named the predecessors of i in S. A chain of players is an ordered list (h 1 ; : : : ; h t ) where h k+1 2 S (h k ), for all k = 1; : : : ; t ¡ 1. The transitive closure of a player i in S is the set S (i) = fj : there exists a chain (h 1 ; : : : ; h t ) with h 1 = i, h t = jg ; whose players are called the subordinates of player i in S. The players in the set
, for all i 2 N . In Gilles et al. [12] the conjunctive approach to games with a permission structure is de…ned. In this approach it is assumed that each player needs permission from all his predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate with other players. Alternatively, in the disjunctive approach as discussed in van den Brink [5] and Gilles and Owen [13] it is assumed that each player needs permission from at least one of his predecessors before he is allowed to cooperate with others players. Thus, the feasible coalitions in the conjunctive and disjunctive approaches respectively are given by the sets abstracting various combinatorial situations. A systematic study of these structures was started by Edelman and Jamison [10] emphasizing the combinatorial abstraction of convexity. The latter was then shown by Edelman [9] to be a crucial property of closures induced by what he called convex geometries, a dual concept of antimatroids (see Bilbao [2] ). Jiménez-Losada [15] introduced antimatroids in games, de…ning games on the coalitions of the set system given by the antimatroid.
De…nition 1 An antimatroid A on N is a family of subsets of 2 N , satisfying
Now, we need to introduce some well-known concepts about antimatroids, which can be found in Korte, Lovász and Schrader [16] .
The de…nition of antimatroid implies the following augmentation property, i.e., if E; F 2 A with jEj > jF j then there exists i 2 E n F such that F [ fig 2 A . From now on we assume that the antimatroid A is normal, i.e., A4. For every i 2 N there exists an E 2 A such that i 2 E.
In particular, this last property implies that N 2 A and therefore this means that the whole group of players decides to cooperate.
Let A be an antimatroid on N. This set family allows to de…ne the interior operator int : 2 N ! A; given by int (E) = S fF µE;F 2Ag F 2 A, for all E µ N: This operator is the dual one of the closure operator in a convex geometry and satis…es the following properties which characterize it:
I1. int (;) = ;;
Let A be an antimatroid on N . A feasible continuation or augmentation point of E 2 A is a player i 2 N n E such that E [ fig 2 A, i.e., those players that can be joined to a feasible coalition keeping feasibility. This elements are denoted as au (E). In a dual way, a player that can leave a feasible coalition E keeping feasibility is called endpoint or extreme point (Edelman and Jamison [10] ). The endpoints of E are denoted by ex (E). By the condition A2 the sets ex (E) 6 = ;, for all E 2 A, E 6 = ;. In the same way, using antimatroid de…nition and A4, the sets au (E) 6 = ;, for all E 2 A, E 6 = N.
A set E in A is a path if it has a single endpoint. So, the set E in A is called an i-path if it has i as unique endpoint. An i-path can be considered as a rooted set denoted by (E; i), i.e., E is a minimal set in A containing i. In particular, a set is in A or is feasible in A if and only if it is a union of paths. This leads to a characterization of antimatroids in terms of paths (see Korte et al. [16] ).
As a generalization of a rooted path in a player, we can give the following concept about coalitions. De…nition 2 Let A be an antimatroid on N and E µ N. A set F µ N is a feasible hull of E if F 2 A, E µ F and there exists no H 2 A with E µ H ½ F , i.e., it is a feasible minimal set in A and contains the set E.
We denote by A (E) the family of feasible hulls of E µ N . Notice that A (E) 6 = ;. We show in the following result that this de…nition generalizes the path de…nition. Proof. If E is a feasible hull of fig, then i 2 E and there exists no F 2 A with i 2 F ½ E. We have to prove that E is an i-path, by condition A2 there exists some endpoint of E, suppose that the possible endpoints j of E are di¤erent from i. In this case, it holds that i 2 E n fjg ½ E and as j is an endpoint E n fjg 2 A, what led us to contradiction. So, the unique endpoint of E is i:
If E is an i-path and it is not a feasible hull of fig then there exists F 2 A with i 2 F and F ½ E. Applying the augmentation property, there exists j 2 E n fig such that E n fjg 2 A. This contradicts the fact that E is an i-path. ¤
Now we consider the relations between acyclic permission structures and antimatroids.
Proposition 2 If the feasible coalition system A is derived from an disjunctive or conjunctive approach of an acyclic permission structure then A is an antimatroid.
Proof. Gilles et al. [12] , Gilles and Owen [13] showed that the feasible coalitions system A derived from the conjunctive or disjunctive approach contains the empty set and that it is closed under union. Therefore, it su¢ces to prove that the system A is accessible. Let S be an acyclic permission structure on N . As N is a …nite set, given a feasible coalition E; E 6 = ;, there exists a player i 2 E such that S(i) \ E = ; by acyclicity of S. Then, the coalition Enfig is also feasible, and hence we obtain the condition A2. ¤
The reverse of Proposition 2 is not true (see Example 1) . This result will later be useful to generalize the restricted games on permission structures and introduce in the next section the restricted games on antimatroids. Next, some speci…c antimatroids are de…ned to characterize the feasible coalition systems derived from the conjunctive approach of an acyclic permission structure.
The so-called poset antimatroids are a particular case of antimatroid, which are formed by the ideals of a poset (partially ordered set) P or, in an equivalent way, by the …lters. Given N consider a poset P = (N; ¹) de…ned on N, a player i covers another player j in P, if j Á i and there is not another player h with j Á h Á i.
N is an ideal of P, if for all i 2 I and j Á i implies that j 2 I; and F is a …lter if for all i 2 F and j Â i then j 2 F . The poset antimatroids can be characterized as the unique antimatroids which are closed under intersection, i.e., if E; F 2 A then E \ F 2 A. Proof. Suppose that A is a poset antimatroid. Let E; F , E 6 = F , be two distinct i-paths for i 2 N. Then E \F 2 A with i 2 E \F . Assume without loss of generality that E n F 6 = ;. By the augmentation property there exists a j 2 E n (E \ F ) = E n F µ E n fig such that E n fjg 2 A. This is in contradiction with E being an i-path.
Suppose that every i 2 N has a unique i-path in A. Take E; F 2 A. If E \ F = ; then E \ F 2 A by A1. If E \ F 6 = ; then by Proposition 1, for every i 2 E \ F there exists an i-path H i 1 µ E and there exists an i-path
In the following result we identify the feasible coalition system derived from the conjunctive approach on an acyclic permission structure with a poset antimatroid. Proof. Let A be a poset antimatroid. For i 2 N; denote the unique i-path in A by P A i . Now, de…ne permission structure S :
We have to prove that S is acyclic. Suppose i 2 b S(i) then there exists (h 1 ; : : : ; h t ) with h 1 = i, h t = i and such that h k+1 2 S (h k ), for all k = 1; : :
is impossible and hence, we get P
nfig µ E, and thus E 2 © c S . By Proposition 2, the feasible coalition system from a conjunctive approach of an acyclic permission structure is an antimatroid. Gilles et al. [12] showed that the feasible coalition system from the conjunctive approach is closed under intersection, therefore this approach is a poset antimatroid. ¤ Now we are interested in characterizing the antimatroids that can be the set of disjunctive feasible coalitions of some acyclic permission structure. With this goal we introduce the following de…nition.
De…nition 3 An antimatroid A satis…es the path property if it is veri…ed
P1. If E is an i-path then Enfig is a path.
A graphic interpretation of the path property can be given by the order de…ned for the feasible coalitions of an antimatroid. Let A be an antimatroid and E 2 A,
, for all i; j 2 E. An antimatroid veri…es the path property if and only if the order de…ned for each path is a total order and moreover if two any players have a established order then they have the same order for every feasible coalition. Next, we identify those antimatroids that satisfy the path property in relation to the feasible coalition systems derived from acyclic permission structures. 
Let S be an acyclic permission structure. By Proposition 2, A = © d S is an antimatroid. We have to prove that A satis…es the path property.
We …rst prove that if E is an i-
Suppose there exists a j 2 E with jS ¡1 (j) \ Ej¸2. We distinguish the following two cases:
which is in contradiction with E being an i-path.
Suppose that S(h)
This gives a contradiction with E being an i-path.
Therefore, we have that if E is an
On the other hand, as i 2 S(j) and S(j) \ F = ; we have that i = 2 F . So, © These examples show that not every antimatroid satis…es the path property.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and the following family of subsets of Figure 1 , A = f;; f1g ; f4g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 4g ; f3; 4g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 3; 4g ; f2; 3; 4g ; Ng ;
then it is easy to see that A is an antimatroid and it does not satisfy the path property, since E = f2; 3; 4g is a 2-path such that Enf2g = f3; 4g is a 3-path. However, F = f1; 2; 3g is another 3-path and 2 2 F .
Example 2 Consider the antimatroid A on N = f1; 2; 3; 4g of Figure 2 , A = f;; f1g; f1; 2g; f1; 3g; f1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4g; f1; 3; 4g; f1; 2; 3; 4gg:
It can be checked that A satis…es the path property.
Example 3 Consider the poset antimatroid B on N = f1; 2; 3; 4g of Figure 3 , B = f;; f1g; f1; 2g; f1; 3g; f1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 3; 4gg:
Note that B does not satisfy the path property since the unique 4-path E = f1; 2; 3; 4g is such that E n f4g = f1; 2; 3g is not a path.
As we have seen in Example 3, posets antimatroids do not satisfy the path property in general. Thus, a logical question is that if it is required this property to this speci…c antimatroids if it is possible to obtain some known subclass of the feasible coalition system derived from conjunctive approach of some acyclic permission structure To establish this relation, we …rst provide a result on games with permission structures. This result states that the permission structures for which the sets of conjunctive and disjunctive feasible coalitions coincide are exactly the permission forest structures. Proof. Let S be an acyclic permission structure. If S is a permission forest structure then for every i 2 N we have that S ¡1 (i) = ; or S ¡1 (i)
The next theorem states that the poset antimatroids satisfying the path property, are exactly those antimatroids that can be obtained as the set of conjunctive or disjunctive feasible coalitions of some permission forest structure. Note that given A a poset antimatroid, A satis…es the path property if and only if it is veri…ed P1. 
Restricted games on antimatroids
A cooperative game on a …nite set of players N is a function v : 2 N ! R such that v(;) = 0. According to the previous section, the interior of a coalition in an antimatroid is the largest part of E that is active or feasible. In other words and taking into account that the antimatroid structure limits the possibilities of coalitional formation in a TU-game, the interior of E are those players of E that are allowed to cooperate. Therefore, the interior is what Gilles et al. [12] and Gilles and Owen [13] called (conjunctive or disjunctive) sovereign part in a permission structure. So, we de…ne a restricted game on an antimatroid for a coalition E as the value obtained on the interior of E.
De…nition 5 Let A be an antimatroid on N . If v is a cooperative game then the restricted game on A is de…ned by v A (E) = v (int (E)) :
Next, we state some properties of restricted games on antimatroids.
Proposition 3 Let A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a monotone game. The following sentences hold 1. The restricted game v A is monotone, moreover given E; F µ N such that
2. If v is superadditive then v A is superadditive, moreover for E; F µ N with
4. If v is totally balanced then v A is totally balanced.
Proof. Notice that to prove the two …rst parts it is only necessary to assume that v is monotone on A, but it is not su¢cient in 3 and 4.
Applying the property I3, we get that the restricted game v A is monotone.
If v is a balanced game then C (v) 6 = ;, i.e., there exists an x 2 C (v). We have to prove that
4. Let E µ N , E 6 = ;. As v is totally balanced it is satis…ed that C (v E ) 6 = ;, there exists x 2 R E such that x (F )¸v (F ), for all F µ E and x (E) = v (E) : If E 2 A then A j E is also an antimatroid on E whose interior operator is the restriction of A to E; therefore (v E ) AjE = (v A ) E . Using sentence 3 we have that
, for all F µ int (E) and x (int (E)) = v (int (E)) : Let y 2 R E be the vector given by
We have to prove that y 2 C ((v A ) E ) : First, note that if F µ E then we obtain
, we have that
Finally, it remains to show that y (E) = v A (E) = v (int (E)) : It is immediate since Proof. Let A be an antimatroid on N with a unique atom i 0 , and let v be monotone. Monotonicity of v A follows from Proposition 3. Let E; F µ N with E \ F = ;. Notice that the fact that the antimatroid has a unique atom means that there is a top player in the permission structure, and if A is atomic then all players are in the same level.
Convexity is a particularly desirable property of a game, since it implies balancedness and superadditivity in combination with some geometric properties of the core. However, there exist examples (see Gilles and Owen [13] ) that show that although the game is monotone and convex and A is an atomic antimatroid, the restricted game on the antimatroid does not have to be convex.
As it is well-known the set of the unanimity games fu T : T µ N; T 6 = ;g is a basis of the vector space ¡ N (set of all TU-games). So, a TU-game v can be expressed as a linear combination of the unanimity games, i.e., v =
is called dividend of T in the game v and d v (;) = 0 (see Harsanyi [14] ).
Our next aim is to obtain the expression of the dividends of the restricted game in terms of the dividends of the original game. For that, we …rst need some results. 
Moreover, its dividends are given, for all F µ N; by
Otherwise, H does not contain any feasible hull of E and therefore u F (H) = 0; for all F 2 A (E), which implies that
If F + E then there is not any H µ F which contains some feasible hull of E and hence d (uE) A (F ) = 0. Finally, if F 2 A (E) ; by de…nition, the unique term in the above formula is obtained for H = F and therefore d (uE) A (F ) = 1. ¤ Next, we consider the particular case from a poset antimatroid. We will take into account that for these antimatroids each coalition has a unique feasible hull (the set obtained as the intersection of all feasible coalitions that contain the coalition) since the intersection is a closed operation.
Corollary 1 Let A be a poset antimatroid on N and E µ N . The restricted game (u E ) A = u T ; where T is the unique feasible hull of E. Moreover, all dividends are null except d (uE ) A (T ) = 1:
This completes the proof. ¤
Using the dividends of the restricted games of unanimity games we can obtain the dividends of any restricted game on the antimatroid.
Theorem 4 Let
A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a cooperative game. The dividends of the game v A are, for all F µ N;
otherwise.
Proof. We …rst suppose that F = 2 A, then
Observe that given E µ F such that E 2 A the possible elements in the set fH µ F : int (H) = Eg are those coalitions H contained in F that contain E but that do not contain any augmentation player of E (by condition A2).
It is satis…ed that k E > 1 since F = 2 A and moreover the set
, by the condition A3 and the augmentation player de…nition.
Suppose that F 2 A, now we use induction on the cardinal of F . If jF j = 1, then F = fig and we have that
since by I1 int (;) = ; and as 
By using the induction hypothesis and the case E = 2 A considered above we have that
As d (uF ) A (F ) = 1 by Proposition 5 and F 2 A, it remains to prove
since F is the unique feasible hull of F . Applying Proposition 5, we get
Taking into account that X
we conclude that
Note that in formula (1) we may take jF j ¡ jT j 6 = 0, because otherwise F would be a feasible hull of E and
In particular, in Proposition 5 the dividends of a non-feasible coalition for the restricted game of a unanimity game are also zero.
Corollary 2 Let A be a poset antimatroid on N and let v be a cooperative game. The dividends of the game v A are given, for all F µ N; by
where here A (E) denote the unique feasible hull of E.
Proof. It is straightforward obtained using Corollary 1 and Theorem 4. Notice that if F = 2 A then d v A (F ) = 0, since in this case F is not a feasible hull. ¤
In the next result we will show that the dividends can be expressed in terms of only the characteristic function evaluated on the feasible coalitions in the antimatroid. For this, we will use the Möbius inversion formula for partially ordered sets (see Stanley [21] ). Notice that an antimatroid A with the inclusion relation is, in particular, a lattice taking into account the following operations, E _ F = E [ F; E^F = int (E \ F ), for all E; F 2 A. We denote by [E; F ] A the interval of coalitions in A that contain E and are contained in F . Given E 2 A the set E + is the coalition formed by E and the augmentation players, i.e.,
Lemma 3 Let A be an antimatroid on N , it holds that 1. If F µ E; E; F 2 A, the interval [F; E] A is a Boolean algebra if and only if E n F = au(F ) \ E.
If E 2 A then [E;
E + ] A is a Boolean algebra.
Proof. 
2. For all i 2 E + n E it holds that i 2 au (E) and therefore E [ fig 2 A. By property (A3) it is concluded that each coalition of [E; E + ] is feasible. ¤ Lemma 4 Let A be an antimatroid on N and E; F 2 A; with F µ E. Then its Möbius function is given by
Proof. It is well-known (Stanley [21] ) that the Möbius function of an interval [F; E] A is zero unless E is the union of those coalitions that cover F in the interval. By the proof of Lemma 3, this is equivalent to E n F = au (F )\ E. By Lemma 3 the equality is true if and only if [F; E] is a Boolean algebra. The Möbius function in the Boolean algebra [F; E] is ¹ (F; E) = (¡1) jEj¡jF j . So, we conclude the result. ¤ Theorem 5 Let A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a cooperative game. The dividends of v A are, for all E µ N ,
Proof. For every E µ N it holds that
By Theorem 4, the dividends of any non-feasible coalition are zero. Given a feasible coalition
Using the Möbius inversion formula (Stanley [21] ) applied to v and d vA on A we get
Then, replacing the Möbius function obtained in Lemma 4 we have that
The following equality is immediate
and by Lemma 3, the interval [F; F + ] A is a Boolean algebra. ¤
The restricted Shapley and Banzhaf values on antimatroids
In this section, we consider the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the restricted game on an antimatroid to obtain new values for a game. Taking into account the cooperation possibilities, the values that we de…ne generalize the Shapley and Banzhaf values de…ned on permission structures and studied in van den Brink and Gilles [4] , van den Brink [5] , Gilles et al. [12] , Gilles and Owen [13] . Given the game v the Shapley [20] and Banzhaf [1] values for the player i in the game v are denoted by Sh i (v) and Ba i (v) respectively and in terms of dividends they are given by
The Banzhaf power index is introduced for voting situations. A generalization for arbitrary cooperative games as in, e.g., Dubey and Shapley [8] and Owen [18] is considered.
De…nition 6 Let A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a cooperative game. The restricted Shapley value is de…ned by Sh (v; A) = Sh (v A ). The restricted Banzhaf value is given by Ba (v; A) = Ba (v A ).
The linearity of these values and Theorem 4 imply that, for every i 2 N ,
From Theorem 5 we can get a formula to compute these values using directly the characteristic function of the original game. Theorem 6 Let A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a cooperative game. We consider the following collections, for i 2 N,
Then 1. The restricted Shapley value for player i is given by
2. The restricted Banzhaf value for player i is given by
where e = jEj and e + = jE + j.
Proof. 1. By Theorem 5 and the formula (2)
Hence,
where we denote by c i (E) the coe¢cient of v(E) in the above sum. We are distinguish two cases: i 2 E and i = 2 E.
e + ¡e dx = (e ¡ 1)! (e + ¡ e)! e + ! :
is a Boolean algebra and hence
Replacing the coe¢cients in the formula it boils down to
In that case, we have that E n fig 2 A and c i (E n fig) = ¡c i (E), and therefore we can group both coe¢cients. If E 2 A i n A + i its coe¢cient appears in the …rst sum but it can not be grouped. Finally, if none of these possibilities happen then E 2 A, i 2 au (E) and
. So, these appear in the second sum. 2. By the above part, we know that
where in this case
and if i 2 au (E) then
Doing the same process as in the case of the Shapley value we get the formula for the Banzhaf value. ¤ Remark 1 Notice that if A = 2 N then the formulas obtained in Theorem 6 are equal to the Shapley and Banzhaf values. Moreover, the equation (3) is e¢cient from the computational point of view and coincides with the equation (11) of Shapley [20] .
To apply the computational method developed in this section we analyze two examples. Example 4 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, given v = u f4g the unanimity game on the coalition f4g and S the acyclic permission structure on N given by (see Figure 4 ).
S(1) = f2; 3g ; S(2) = S(3) = f4g ; S (4) = ;:
The disjunctive and the conjunctive approaches in the permission structure are the antimatroids considered in Examples 2 and 3 respectively (see Figures 2 and 3) .
To compute the restricted Shapley value on A and B we use the formula (3) since so we only have to calculate A i and fE 2 A : i 2 au (E)g. Notice that with this formula, if the game changes but the structure continue being the same the calculations on these sets only are done once. So, the corresponding sets A i belong to the disjunctive approach are given by A 1 = ff1g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 3; 4g ; Ng ; A 2 = ff1; 2g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; Ng ; A 3 = ff1; 3g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 3; 4g ; Ng ; A 4 = ff1; 2; 4g ; f1; 3; 4g ; Ng ; and fE 2 A : 1 2 au (E)g = f;g ; fE 2 A : 2 2 au (E)g = ff1g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 3; 4gg ; fE 2 A : 3 2 au (E)g = ff1g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 2; 4gg ; fE 2 A : 4 2 au (E)g = ff1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2; 3gg ; thus, applying the above formula we obtain Sh (v; A) = (5=12; 1=12; 1=12; 5=12) and in a similar way Sh (v; B) = (1=4; 1=4; 1=4; 1=4). Now, the following example shows that the generalization of the model of permission structures to antimatroids has applications in other scopes.
Example 5 Let G = (V; A) be a directed graph with root r 2 V and c : V ! R a map on the nodes called capacity function. A directed path with root r and c-compatible is a sequence of vertices (r; x 1 ; : : : ; x k ), such that rx 1 : : : x k is a directed path and such that c (r)¸k; c (x 1 )¸k ¡ 1; : : : ; c (x k )¸0: We interpret N = V n frg as the clients of a certain source r and the edges as the directed network that can be established among the clients from the source. The capacity of a vertex is the quantity that can be retransmitted from it. The feasible coalitions that the clients can form are those in which, without in ‡uence of others, can connect to the source through a directed c-compatible path. The structure that is de…ned is an antimatroid called capacitated point search, A = ½ E µ N : 8x 2 E; 9 c-compatible path (r; x 1 ; : : : ; x k ) such that fx 1 ; : : : ; x k g µ E and x k = x ¾ :
These antimatroids do not satisfy the path property that characterize to the antimatroids which derived from a disjunctive approach on an acyclic permission structure, further they are not poset antimatroids, as it is seen in the following example. Consider the directed graph corresponding to Figure 5 , whose antimatroid of feasible coalitions is the one described in Example 1. If we suppose that the source o¤ers a discount in the prices of its service to groups that ask for it, depending on their needs, the clients will obtain a pro…t cooperating among them. We de…ne a game that prizes this pro…t for each cooperation assuming that it is proportional to the clients number. Without loss of generality we consider v (S) = jSj ¡ 1, for every non-empty coalition S µ N and v (;) = 0. In a cooperation among several players logically will be taken into account the maximal feasible coalition that the players can form. We used the Shapley value on the game v A to determine how to divide the pro…ts of a hypothetical cooperation among the four clients. In order to calculate the payo¤ of the player 1 through the formula (3) obtained in Theorem 6 we have to calculate before the sets A i and fE 2 A : i 2 au (E)g. So, for instance A 1 = ff1g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 4g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 3; 4g ; f1; 2; 3; 4gg ; fE 2 A : 1 2 au (E)g = f;; f4g ; f3; 4g ; f2; 3; 4gg :
In this way, the division of the pro…ts of the total cooperation, v (N) = 3 is given by Sh (v; A) = (5=6; 2=3; 2=3; 5=6) :
